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There are good reasons to test more refined measures of protest to better understand protesters’ disaffection with and disconnection from politics. This article assesses whether disaffection and disconnection predict each of: protest participation (aggregated); participation in demonstrations; and differential participation in demonstrations.  Failure to vote does not predict participation in demonstrations, but positively predicts participation in ‘protest’ (aggregated). Those who demonstrate more frequently are more likely participate in electoral politics than less frequent demonstrators. Most protesters are at least moderately engaged with formal politics, despite lacking trust in political institutions. Protest is not, therefore, a straightforward expression of anti-politics.





There has been much talk, and increasing levels of concern, on the subject of disaffection in democracies (Dalton 2008; Torcal 2003). Especially across Western industrialised nations, citizens appear to express high levels of disengagement from formal political institutions. In particular, many scholars have documented low levels of satisfaction with and trust in governments, politicians and political parties (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).  In the UK, for example, only two in every ten people have trusted politicians to tell the truth since the 1970s  (Hay and Stoker 2009). This has been accompanied by a loss of partisanship in political parties (Whiteley 2009), reduced party campaigning (Scarrow 2007) and declining electoral turnouts (Blais 2007).  Electoral turnout for UK general elections was as high as 83.9% in 1950, but had dwindled to 59.4% by 2001 (Stoker 2011:33). 
Yet does this mean that people have come to dislike politics and have consequently withdrawn from it in every shape and form? At least by some accounts, the outlook is not entirely bleak. Scholars have argued that the decline in formal political participation has been accompanied by the rise of single-issue politics, expressed through increased levels of participation in citizen groups and social movements (see, for example, Dalton 2008 and Norris 2002). As Norris states with reference to what she calls a ‘democratic phoenix’, ‘the obituary for civic activism is premature’ (Norris 2002: 3). Although some of the evidence purporting a rise in protest is questionable because the number of people engaged in protest is not necessarily growing year-on-year (Stoker et al 2011: 54-6) it is certainly the case that those who engage in protest and express dissatisfaction with democracy continue to have strong support for democratic principles (Curtice and Jowell 1997). Thus, the foundations of democracy as a system appear to hold firm.
Dalton’s  (1999:69) work pre-dates but concurs with Norris’ (2002) idea that there is a ‘democratic phoenix’. He states that ‘there is at least indirect evidence that perceptions of the appropriate role for citizens now emphasise a more participatory style and greater willingness to challenge authority’. Expressing what might be called a form of ‘anti-politics’,  perhaps more accurately termed ‘anti-formal-politics’, citizens are now considered to more commonly focus their attention on a smaller number of issues that matter to them instead of engaging with a broader ideology or party political platform (Dalton 1996: 37).  This leads to a form of ‘viral’, ‘anarchic’ and ‘citizen-led’ politics (Hay and Stoker 2009), which sets off a negative spiral, arguably making it increasingly more difficult for governments and political parties to satisfy the electorate as time passes. Part of the appeal of protest may be that it allows individuals to pick-and-choose the issues in which they engage. Individuals may thus find it preferable to having to select a particular party manifesto, as there may be elements within party platforms towards which they are unfavourable. Protest, unlike many aspects of engagement in formal politics, allows individuals and groups to choose and frame not only the issues that matter to them, but also the timing and the location of their political participation.
This article has three main aims centred on understanding the relationship between protest and anti-politics and how this might be best measured. Its primary purpose is to shed fresh light on the extent to which those who engage in protest are a-partisan and disinterested in, distrustful of, and disconnected from formal politics.  If protest – operationalized in various ways – is associated with being disaffected with and disconnected from formal politics then we might be able to corroborate claims which suggest that protest is a reaction to anti-politics. Some might think that these questions have already been adequately addressed in the extant literature. However, there are a number of reasons why we might consider re-examining the evidence. In this article, I focus, in particular, on three key reasons. Firstly, ‘protest’ as a dependent variable is often operationalized generically, incorporating multiple types of political participation. Whilst this – true to the research programme’s aims – has sharpened our understanding of the drivers of non-conventional versus conventional forms of political participation, it arguably masks differences between people who engage in different types of protest.  It seems sensible to begin to test predictors for different types of protest separately not least because some forms of what has become known as protest are incredibly routinized and others remain relatively rare. Thus, a second aim of the article is to compare and contrast the extent to which measures of disaffection with and disconnection from formal politics predict a) participation in legal demonstrations only, and b) participation in protest more generically measured.
Secondly, many large-scale cross national surveys ask for only yes-no answers in response to questions about participation in protest / street demonstrations. The third aim of the article, therefore, is to compare and contrast models in which the binary (yes-no) measure of participation in street demonstrations is predicted to models which predict more nuanced measures gauging the intensity and frequency of participation in street demonstrations. The purpose of the article is therefore not to develop theory beyond an assessment of the anti-politics thesis, but instead to understand how predictors of protest participation may vary when we alter the way in which protest participation is operationalized.
 	A final issue with the extant evidence, partially addressed by this article, is that surveys of political participation are often conducted outside of the context of political action itself, resulting in evidence that may not be too reliable. To address this final problem, I make use, in one of the steps in the analysis, of data collected as part of a European-wide project that involved surveying people as they engaged in street demonstrations. I proceed by assessing the current evidence on the relationship between political disaffection / disconnection and protest and then expanding on these three problems. After this, I introduce the datasets and key variables deployed in regression models. 
Existing evidence on anti-politics and protest
The existing evidence suggests that protesters are not entirely disconnected from formal politics, although they express some minor disaffection from it. Barnes, Kaase and their collaborators (1979) found that, across Western democracies, ‘unconventional political participation’ (a host of forms of political participation outside of electoral politics) and conventional political participation (electoral politics) were closely related. Thus, it is conceived that protesters do not protest because they are disconnected from formal politics, but instead because they want to add additional volume to their voice. In this view, protest is not simply anti (formal) politics, but instead an extension of electoral politics.​[2]​ The worrisome implication is that if it truly is the case that those who protest also engage in electoral politics, claims about the rise of a democratic phoenix, which is considered to compensate for declining electoral turnout, may be inaccurate.
Using similar indicators of unconventional political participation drawn from World Values Survey data, Norris, amongst other things, assessed protesters’ disaffection with formal politics (Norris 1999). She found only a little support for the idea that they were disaffected: protesters expressed lower confidence in political institutions (but this was only very weakly significant) and exhibited high levels of political interest compared to non-protesters. Dalton also found weak links between protest and disaffection with formal politics. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), module 2, Dalton presents a regression model which shows that there is a weak but statistically significant link between dissatisfaction with government performance and protest participation in France and Germany, but no link between the two variables in Great Britain and the US (Dalton 2008: 68). But does this evidence hold when we single out those who participate in street demonstrations? How does it compare to a more generic measure of protest participation? And how do disaffection and disconnection vary across protesters who engage in street demonstrations to varying degrees of frequency and intensity? Before addressing these questions, I discuss some of the ways in which the existing evidence may be re-examined to produce more nuanced research findings.
Operationalising protest
Firstly, I examine the broad definition of protest adopted in most of the literature on political participation and suggest why it might make sense to adopt predictor variables operationalized instead by participation in a particular type of protest. Many studies of political protest have lumped participation in lawful demonstrations with some very different types of political acts, some of which are light-touch, and others of which are engaged in by only a tiny minority of the population.​[3]​ Whilst this approach has been useful for drawing distinctions between conventional and unconventional political participation, it masks over differences between types of protest. Light-touch ‘protest’ acts include the signing of petitions and joining boycotts. These require relatively little effort on the part of participants and in this regard they quite drastically contrast with minority acts of protest like the occupation of buildings/factories. To date, only a very small minority of studies have singled out different types of protest in recognition of this fact. Biggs’ (2013) work, which focuses largely on trends in striking, is one exception. Usefully, he quite uniquely excludes the common act of signing of petitions from his operationalization of the concept of protest. It is unfortunate that such careful handling of different types of protest is rare.
According to European Social Survey (ESS) data in 2005, around thirty times more individuals across Europe claim to have signed a petition in comparison to those having occupied a building (Stoker et al 2011). Furthermore, as Torcal (2003:36) argues, ‘each type of participation requires, amongst other things, different degrees of initiative, commitment, information and objectives on the part of citizens’. It is well-established in the social movements’ literature that the predictors for ‘high-risk activism’ – which incorporates the occupation of buildings – differ from the predictors of ‘low-risk activism’ e.g. signing petitions and attending lawful demonstrations (McAdam 1986). Although Marsh in his classic work in the 1970s claimed to have found, through factor analysis, uni-dimensionality in a range of political acts –including signing petitions, lawful demonstrations, boycotts, rent strikes, unofficial strikes, occupying buildings and blocking traffic – the latter four acts load negatively on a second factor identified (Marsh 1977:249).  To make this clearer, if uni-dimensionality really was evident, this would mean that if someone does one political act they tend to do another. However, the negative loading suggests that there are some people who engage only in the lighter touch political acts, such as the signing of petitions. 
Given that the range of acts often lumped together under the label of ‘protest’ are differentially distributed, and require variable degrees of commitment, we should, consequently, when building explanatory models, be aware of the likelihood that predictors for one type of unconventional political act may be different from another (Torcal 2003:36). Of course, certain individuals may favour one type of protest over another, which provides us with a further solid reason for separating out different types of political acts. This argument certainly rings bells with the social movements’ literature, in which Jasper asserts that protesters engaging in a particular type of action often share a ‘taste in tactics’ (Jasper 1997). Thus, it makes sense to test to see whether the predictors for one type of protest – in this article I use the example of participation in legal demonstrations – are the same as for protest as an aggregated measure.
Asking questions
I now focus upon issues surrounding the wording of survey questions. Some of these issues are remnants of historical survey design which have, quite necessarily, been retained for the purposes of making comparisons overtime. To entirely ditch old questions might be a sore mistake, breaking our ability to make comparisons over time. Having said this, there is no reason why new questions cannot be added to existing core modules of European surveys of political participation.  One weakness of the survey battery on political participation in the ESS is that it only asks whether protesters have participated in a legal street demonstration in the past 12 months, providing  just the answer options of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The restrictive answer options preclude the possibility to make comparisons between those who have engaged in differential protest participation (Saunders et al 2012). Put differently, it does not allow us to compare and contrast those who participated in a street demonstration only once in the past 12 months from those who have participated with higher degrees of frequency and intensity.  However, the protest survey data-set that I draw upon in this article (more below) allows us to measure whether those who protest more than others differ from those who protest less. Thus, a new and interesting question to ask is: are individuals with more experience in street demonstrations more or less a-partisan and disinterested, distrustful, and disconnected from formal politics than those with less experience? 
Unfortunately, it can sometimes be difficult to interpret evidence derived from cross-national surveys, because different surveys use variants of question wording to measure protest participation. Although all appear use the simple ‘yes’, ‘no’ binary for actual protest participation as discussed above, some, like the ESS ask only if people have protested in the last 12 months. Others, including the World Values Survey and European Values Survey, however, ask respondents whether they ‘have done’ a range of political acts – at any stage in their lifetimes. Studies that draw on survey evidence using the ‘have done’ variant of the question have a considerably greater tendency to report a steady rise in protest participation since the 1970s. This is because there is a cumulative effect at work here. Thus, someone who engaged in just one street demonstration in 1974 would be added to the aggregate total of those ‘having done’ ‘attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations’ in recently collected data. Inevitably, this will indicate an increase in the proportion of people having engaged in protest over-time, and to the exaggeration of a rising trend in protest participation. Certainly in Britain, the proportion of those participating in a ‘demonstration, picket or march’ has remained small and relatively constant at least in the period 2003-10, amounting to between 4 and 6 per cent with no obvious upward trend (Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement 2003-8, cited in Stoker 2011: 26). The ludicrousness of using the ‘ever’ question to plot trends in political participation is neatly illustrated with reference to election studies. If we asked individuals whether they had ‘ever’ voted in a general election and used that to understand trends in electoral voting, there would probably be scant evidence of disconnection from formal politics, unless the focus was exclusively on first-time voters.
This point can be further illustrated with reference to data coming out of surveys using two different question wordings. Rucht (2007) reports that the proportion of people attending lawful demonstrations in West European countries in 1999-2002 was 27.3% (averaged over the three year period). Stoker et al (2011), in contrast, report that only 9.3% of Europeans had taken part in ‘lawful public demonstrations’ in 2002. How do we explain the differences? One unlikely explanation is that there was a dramatic downward trend in participation in protests between 1999 and 2002. It may also be the case that the slightly different samples of countries included in the two sets of analyses partially accounts for the discrepancy. But the different question-wording is likely to be the main explanation. The European Values Survey (EVS) data, drawn upon by Rucht (2007), asks whether people have done these acts without specifying a time period. In contrast, the ESS asks, instead, only about participation in the past 12 months. The question wording in the latter survey avoids the cumulative effect. Furthermore, it avoids the somewhat problematic categorisation of someone as a (recent) protester if they protested only once in, say, 1974. 
Dekker and colleagues (1997) point out a further weakness of the ‘ever’ question, which they themselves employ. They suggest that the question under-estimates the extent of protest in countries where a small activist minority frequently engages in protest. Conversely, therefore, it over-estimates the extent of protest in countries where a higher number of activists engage infrequently in protest. This is partly how they explain the different findings they draw from analyses at the individual and national aggregate levels. Seeking to understand whether protest is an extension of or alternative to conventional political participation, they find, at the individual level, that conventional political participation, associational participation and unconventional political participation are positively related. But things look very different at the aggregated country level. As they state: ‘at this level … no indication for a positive relation of conventional social and political participation with participation in unconventional protest activities is found’ Dekker et al 1997: 227).  In addition to survey question issues, they explain this by claiming that: 
this can … be accounted for by a different character of ‘protest’: i.e. part of the normal routine in the north, but an anti-system practice in the south. In turn, it implies different relationships between protest and trust in government: neutral or even positive in the north versus negative in the south.
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), module 2, used by Dalton, which, as reported above, found weak evidence of a link between protest and disaffection, was drawn from the survey question asking: ‘Over the past five years or so, have you done any of the following things to express your views about something the government should or should not be doing?’. ‘Five years or so’ is a very imprecise period of time, and will suffer all sorts of reliability issues, perhaps most significantly recall issues on the part of respondents. A further problem with this question – at least from the perspective taken in this article – is that by mentioning the government as the target of protest, it asks only about protest with a policy objective. Consequently, this measure is likely to over-estimate the link between conventional and less conventional political participation.
Should scholars persist in creating statistical models in which the dependent variable measures something that may have taken place over thirty years ago, as with the EVS and WVS questions, or as in the case of CSES within the ‘last five years or so’, and the independent variables measure current values and attitudes towards the institutions of government, it is impossible to infer any causality what-so-ever. Even though causation is difficult to prove in survey research, it even calls into question the nature of the association between two variables. Thus, we might be justified in being sceptical of findings that use the simple measure of ‘have done’ (without a specified period of 12-months) as a dependent variable in statistical models. For all these reasons, I elect to perform analysis on the ESS dataset – which asks about political participation in the past 12 months – rather than an alternative. To understand effects at the aggregated (country) level, pointed out by Dekker and colleagues, I also include interaction terms between country and trust in institutions.
Out of context
A further and final potential major problem with classic studies of political engagement is the decontextualised use of survey methodology. In other words, many surveys use data drawn outside of the context of political participation itself, which raises questions about the reliability of survey items. According to Dryzek (2000: 164), standard survey research ‘can only pick up the echoes of past situations in which people were engaged politically’.  Fortunately, there is a way around this problem. It is possible to ‘catch’ people in the act of political participation – in other words, to survey them whilst they engage in order to contextualise their political activity. The protest survey methodology, which was used to collect some of the data I draw upon in this article, does exactly that.
Research questions and hypotheses	
Given the need to build on previous research with more nuanced measures of protest participation, the time seems ripe to investigate the extent to which measures of disaffection and disconnection with politics predict participation in protest generally, in street demonstrations specifically, and the intensity and frequency of participation in street demonstrations particularly. In order to compare and contrast what we can learn from rather blunt instruments compared to more refined ones, I model data from the ESS (which has a yes/no response) in two ways: a) participants in street demonstrations; and b) participation in a range of types of protest that have been aggregated. I compare this to modelled data collected from protest surveys (which asks protesters about the frequency and intensity of their participation in street demonstrations). Put differently, for the first time, we are able check for nuances among the protest population in their extent of disaffection with and disconnection from formal political institutions. Thus, I assess the added value of a more discriminant measure of the frequency and intensity participation in street demonstrations compared to the dichotomous yes/no response offered by the ESS; and compared to a generic measure of protest.

Methods
The empirical section of this article draws on two datasets: the most recent wave of the ESS (Wave 5, 2010) and the first wave of the European protest project (2009-12). The ESS data is used in two separate regression models allowing us to compare predictors of two (yes/no) dichotomous dependent variables measuring protest participation in the past 12 months. The first of these is a response to the question asking about participation in legal demonstrations. The second is an aggregated ‘protest’ variable measuring participation in at least one of boycotts, wearing a badge/pin, participating in legal demonstrations and signing a petition.​[4]​ In a second step, these models are compared to one where we have a yet more nuanced dependent variable (based on the frequency and intensity of protest), drawn from the protest survey data, detailed below. To make the ESS data-set broadly comparable with the protest survey dataset I focus the analysis on the five country cases included in the protest survey dataset: the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. Once missing values are filtered out, the sample size is 4,420. Design weights have been applied to the ESS data prior to analysis to account for over- and under-sampling within particular country cases.​[5]​ Although this is an individual level analysis, in addition to running a main effects binary logistic regression model, I also tested for the significance of interactions between country and trust in political institutions. I did this in the light of the country effects that Dekker et al (1997) found at the aggregate compared to individual level, insomuch as that in some countries individuals were generally more or less trusting than in others. In the modelling of the ESS data, interaction effects between country and trust in each of parliament, the legal system and political parties were insignificant so they are not reported in the regression output.​[6]​
Secondly, I use data drawn from the European collaborative Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation project collected in 2009-12 (n=11,820) (Klandemans et al 2009). This data is modelled using multi-nomial logistic regression, including interaction effects between country and trust in political institutions. The dependent variable (explained below) is constructed by looking at protesters’ frequency of participation in street demonstrations both in the past 12 months and across their life-times.
The protest survey methodology involves a team of researchers deploying standardized methodology to collect data from protesters whilst out in the streets on large-scale demonstrations. To work properly, the surveying procedure requires around one-thousand protesters to be present at a demonstration. At each protest surveyed, approximately one thousand mail-back surveys are distributed using a ‘pointer’ – or team leader – to approximately randomly select respondents (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). One fifth of these surveys are accompanied by a matched numbered face-to-face interview. Since the refusal rates for face-to-face interviews are low (usually less than 10%), this makes it possible for us to gauge the types of people that do and do not respond to the survey, allowing us to roughly assess the representativity of the data. Whilst the size and shape of protests makes it impossible to hand out surveys entirely randomly, the matched/paired face-to-face interview and mail-back survey technique reflects the state-of-the-art in protest surveying, allowing for systematic data collection across a variety of countries.
The protest survey dataset analysed for this article includes data drawn from fifty-two large scale street demonstrations across the five countries mentioned above.​[7]​ Although the project has not surveyed a representative sample of protests across these five countries, it has certainly covered a significant cross-section.  Please see on-line supplementary material (1) for a list of the demonstrations surveyed, their location and date.

Representativity of the protest survey data
A comparison of those who respond to the face-to-face survey only and those who respond to the face-to-face survey in conjunction with the mail back survey reveals only minor differences. This suggests that the data is fairly representative of the approximately random sample of protesters selected as respondents. There are no significant differences between respondents in these two subsamples regarding the following variables: when protesters made a firm decision to participate in the protest and whether they are a member of an organisation staging the demonstration (measured by kendall’s tau-b). A chi squared test reveals no significant difference in gender distribution across the two groups, and the T-Test result comparing the age of protesters is insignificant. However, there are significant differences in the extent to which those in the two sub-samples are interested in politics and in extent to which they hold educational qualifications. Those who responded to the face-to-face interview but did not return the mail back questionnaire are slightly less interested in politics. 16.5% of them claim to be either not at all or not very interested, compared to 12.8% of those who were questioned in the face-to-face interview and who returned the postal questionnaire (kendall’s tau-b = 0.030**). Although there are significant differences in the highest educational qualification of participants in the two samples (kendall’s tau = 0.078***), the differences are not major: those who responded to both the face-to-face and mail back surveys are slightly more highly educated than those responding only to the face-to-face. 59.7% of the former group have a university qualification or are currently studying at university, compared to 53.3% of the latter group. 
The significant differences across the samples with respect to political interest and educational level are not surprising. Individuals who are more interested in politics and more highly educated are, as expected, more likely to complete and return a questionnaire on a political subject . These representativity tests and the impossibility of distributing surveys entirely randomly do suggest the need for slight caution in the interpretation of results. 
Variables in the analysis
In the regression models deployed to predict whether and the extent to which people take part in protest / legal street demonstrations the dependent variable from ESS models is a simple ‘yes/no’ model. But the dependent variable for the protest survey data is based on frequency and intensity of protest. Drawing on work on differential protest participation by Saunders et al (2012), I distinguish between novices, returners, repeaters and stalwarts. This was derived from the survey question: “How many times have you taken part in a demonstration…”—“ever” and “in the past twelve months.” The answer options for each question were: “Never,” “1-5,”​[8]​ “6-10,” “11-20,” and “21+.” The two different time periods (ever and past 12 months) were used to distinguish between four patterns of protest participation over time:
1)	 “Novices” answered “never” when asked whether they had ever (previously) participated in demonstrations;
2)	“Returners” are those who claim to have participated in 1-5 protests “ever” and at least one protest in the past 12 months (including the one surveyed at);
3)	“Repeaters” claim to have participated in at least 6 protests “ever” and at least one protest in the past 12 months (including the one surveyed at);
4)	“Stalwarts” claim to have participated in 6 or more demonstrations in both the past 12 months and “ever.” ​[9]​
The independent variables in the regression models seek to measure the extent of disaffection with and disconnection from politics. To make the comparison neat, I include only variables that are common across the two data-sets. For derivation of the variables, please see online supplementary material (2). Where ‘interest’ in politics and ‘trust’ in political institutions (parliament, political parties and the legal system) are lacking, I take this to represent disaffection from politics. On the basis of previous studies, we might expect political interest to positively distinguish protesters from non-protesters (whether aggregated or street demonstrators only); and that the most intense participants in street demonstrations be most politically interested. We also might tentatively hypothesize that distrust in formal political institutions is likely to characterize protesters, and be more pronounced amongst those most intensely participating. 
 Little identification with their closest political party, failure to vote in the general election and not contacting a politician within the past 12 months to influence political decisions are taken as measures of disconnection from formal politics.  Voting in the general election does not, however, necessarily signify connection to formal politics in cases where the respondent voted for a minor party. Consequently, I also build in a new measure of disconnection – whether or not individuals voted for a minor party in the previous general election. I classify a minor party as one receiving less than 10% of the aggregate vote in the last general election. Should the anti-politics thesis hold, we might hypothesize that – excepting political interest – indicators of disaffection and disconnection positively distinguish protesters from non-protesters; and that these variables’ predictive capacity increases with frequency and intensity of protest participation.  
Possible limitations of the research
It should be pointed out that the research conducted here presents only a snap-shot in time and that some of the variables measure only temporary phenomena common in a democracy. Measures of distrust in the institutions of national government and national parliament, for example, are what Dalton (1999) refers to as ‘specific support’, reflecting the current government and make-up of parliament. It is important to include these variables as they reflect contingent political opportunities (Saunders 2009). If there is a problem, it is compensated by also measuring some more affective orientations such as extent of identification with the political party with which respondents most closely identify. 
Some might consider that the dependent variable for the protest survey data discriminates against younger people, who will have been afforded fewer opportunities to protest. However, previous analyses using a very similar dependent variable suggest that this effect is only minor (Saunders et al 2012). Note also that although the data includes various country cases, the focus of the analysis is largely on aggregate data across all countries. While the purpose is not a robust cross-national comparison, which falls beyond the scope of this general exploration of anti-politics amongst European protesters, I do, as explained above, model interaction effects for country against trust in political institutions (see also note 6). 
It might be considered that a further weakness of the dependent variable in the protest survey data is that it is constructed using a mixture of present (in the past 12 months) and former (‘ever’) participation in street demonstrations. Consequently, it uses measures of current disengagement with and disconnection with formal politics to predict something that happened in both the present and the past (Saunders et al 2012). However, I would argue that this is much less problematic than modelling on the dependent variable derived from the ‘ever’ question. Recall that with the ‘ever’ question a protester who has engaged in a protest once in, say, 1974 would be placed into a category with other protesters. Their current values would then be used to predict participation in a protest that took place decades ago, even though they could no longer be said to be a protester. Although the protest survey dependent variable factors in past participation in demonstrations, we can rest assured that the respondents to the protest survey had recently protested in a demonstration, for they were ‘caught in the act’.
The data	
In the ESS data, 25.4% of the sample claimed to have participated in at least one form of protest (boycotts, badge/pin wearing, street demonstrations and signing a petition) in the past 12 months. In comparison, only 6.6% of the sample claim to have participated in a demonstration in that same period. This suggests that participation in demonstrations is a relatively minor political act, and certainly not as popular as implied in studies drawing on the WVS and EVS datasets (which ask the ‘ever’ question). The starkly different frequencies for participation in protest aggregated compared to the more discrete measure of participation legal demonstrations illustrate why it might make sense to test the predictors of different forms of participation in unconventional politics more discretely. Participation in legal demonstrations is low despite an anti-austerity agenda across Europe that has sparked several large-scale street demonstrations. Through looking at the protest survey data, we are able to zoom in much more closely on street demonstrators. In the protest survey sample, I find that the majority are in what Saunders et al (2012) call the ‘middle group’: they are neither novices nor stalwarts. Stalwarts make up the smallest minority of the sample (8.5%), followed by novices (Table 1).  
<Table 1 about here>
Results
Firstly, I present the three dependent variables (yes-no participation in aggregated forms of protest and in legal demonstrations only from the ESS, and intensity and frequency of protest from the protest survey data) cross-tabulated by the independent variables, showing only the percentage of respondents that selected the most negative answers possible in relation to their affection with (Table 2) and connection to (Table 3) formal political institutions.
A minority (10%) of those who participate in protest – of both any sort and in street demonstrations only – are not at all interested in politics. Proportionally twice as many of those not participating in any form of protest claim to be not at all interested in politics compared to those who do participate. Among street demonstrators caught in the act of protesting, the proportion not at all interested in politics is generally much lower (2.8% for novices) and declines further with intensity and frequency of protest. It is important to note that the protest survey findings could partly be an artefact of the response rate bias (remember that I found that those who are more politically interested are more likely to respond to the protest survey than those who are not). Hence, it is possible that the protest survey underestimates disinterest in politics. 
The picture is slightly more complicated when considering trust in institutions. Although the pattern of responses is similar for trust in political parties and parliament, it differs for trust in the legal system. Among protesters (in aggregate) fewer are least trusting in political parties and parliament compared to non-protesters. But the pattern is reversed when looking only at those participating in legal demonstrations. A higher proportion of those who engage in legal demonstrations are least trusting in these two institutions compared to those who do not. Regarding trust in the legal system, protesters (both in aggregate and in legal demonstrations as a discrete category) are more frequently least trusting than non-protesters. For all three variables measuring trust in institutions, we can see from the protest survey data that distrust increases with intensity and frequency of participation. As anticipated, protesters as a general category are generally less extremely disaffected than those who participate in legal demonstrations.
<Table 3 about here>
Regarding measures of disconnection, the differences between protesters (aggregated) and participants in legal demonstrations are small, except for not contacting a politician (Table 3). Proportionally three times (76.7%) as many non-protesters have not contacted a politician in the past 12 months compared to aggregated protesters (23.3%).  With regards to the protest survey data, markedly fewer stalwarts have not contacted a politician in the past 12 months compared to novices. Few activists – at least when measured by the ESS survey – are not at all close to a political party. Whereas more protesters (in aggregate) than non-protesters are not close to a political party, fewer legal demonstrators than non-demonstrators are not close. Identification with a political party appears to increase with intensity and frequency of participation, such that far fewer stalwarts are not at all close to a political party compared to novices. In general, fewer protesters (whether aggregated or street demonstrators only) failed to vote in the last general election compared to non-protesters. With regards to elections, there is a curvilinear relationship between frequency and intensity of participation in street protest and having not voted in the last general election. Although fewer of our protest survey respondents did not vote in the general election compared to the ESS sample, the highest proportion of non-voters in the protest survey sample are to be found in the two extreme categories of protesters: novices and stalwarts. Yet we should not assume that this makes stalwarts fans of conventional politics, for a very high proportion of street demonstrators voted for a minority party in the last general election rather than a mainstream one, with the proportion increasing from almost half (for novices) to marginally less than two-thirds (for stalwarts). While there are only small differences in rates of voting for a minor party between those who do and do not participate in street demonstrations, almost twice as many aggregated protesters vote for a minor party compared to non-protesters. 
<Table 3 about here>
Table 4 shows the results of a binary logistic regression model, which, along with standard controls used to predict political participation (age, education, and employment status​[10]​) and the country in which the survey took place, uses measures of disaffection with and disconnection from formal politics to predict: a) whether individuals participate in legal demonstrations or not and b) whether individuals participate in protest (aggregated) or not. The results suggest that there is no straightforward relationship between disaffection with and disconnection from participation in protest – of any sort. For predicting participation in both legal demonstrations and protest (aggregated) the only significant predictor for my operationalization of (dis)affection is being politically interested, once other variables in the models are controlled for. Participants in both aggregated protest and demonstrations are more politically interested. Trust in political institutions is insignificant. Regarding (dis)connection, contacting a politician in the past 12 months and close identification with a political party are both significant predictors. Thus, it seems that withdrawal from the ballot box is not straightforwardly related to a tendency to take to the streets or to participate more generally in alternative forms of politics. Yet exercise of a protest vote by voting for a minor party is also a significant predictor of participation in street demonstrations and aggregated protest. There is one important significant difference between the two models presented in Table 4. Protesters (aggregated) are 0.75 times significantly more likely to be non-voters than non-protesters, whereas this variable is non-significant for predicting participation in street demonstrations.
The control variables suggest that protesters (aggregated) are more likely to be younger, to be qualified and come from any country but the UK. These control variables are more discriminatory in predicting participation in street demonstrations whereby street demonstrators are more likely to come from Belgium and have a post-graduate qualification. However, in both models there are no significant interaction effects between the country in which protests took place and trust in political institutions. 
<Table 4 about here>
Table 5 shows the results of the more nuanced multi-nomial model, which draws on the protest survey data and allows comparison across individuals who engage in street demonstrations with differing degrees of intensity and frequency. This model suggests, with regards to (dis)affection from politics, that political interest increases with frequency and intensity of protest. Trust in parliament is higher for repeaters than novices, but markedly lower for stalwarts. Only stalwarts are significantly more likely to express distrust in the legal system than novices, perhaps because they have more experience in the politics of the policing of protests. There are no statistically significant differences between the four groups of protesters regarding their extent of trust in political parties. Regarding measures of political (dis)connection, I find that contacting politicians differentiates the groups as a matter of degree – those who attend street protests most frequently and with the greatest intensity have the highest odds of having contacted a politician in the past 12 months. Closeness to a political party increases with intensity of protest (stalwarts are three times more likely to closely identify with a political party than novices). Hardened activists, though, are more likely to have voted for a minor party: stalwarts are over three times more likely to have done so than novices, although they are also even more likely to have not at all voted.
Regarding the control variables, all three groups of protesters are distinguished from novices by being older, although stalwarts are less likely to be old than repeaters, and the differences across the three groups are, as anticipated, small. Protesters in the ‘middle group’ are most likely from Spain. Although participants in legal demonstrations are most likely to have come from the Netherlands (Table 5), protest survey data suggests that Dutch street demonstrators are less likely to be repeaters and stalwarts (Table 5). There are two significant interaction effects between trust in institutions and being surveyed in the Netherlands. Compared to novices, returners and repeaters are more likely to be – in combination – from the Netherlands and trusting in political parties, but less likely to be from the Netherlands and trusting in parliament.
<Table 5 about here>
Conclusion
In the conclusion, I address the four key questions raised by the article: To what extent does protest appear to be a reaction to anti-politics and/or to represent the emergence of a democratic phoenix? What can we learn from generic measures (protest aggregated) versus more specific measures (i.e. street demonstrations only) of protest? What happens when we take a yet more nuanced measure of street protest that considers frequency and intensity of participation in street demonstrations? And to what extent might the results of the more nuanced measure be an artefact of contextualising political participation within the political context itself? Answering these questions allows me to additionally make useful suggestions for future research.
Comparing across four groups – those who do and do not participate in any form of protest; and those who do and do not participate in legal demonstrations – reveals that the latter group (that is, individuals who do not engage in legal demonstrations but who may, or may not, engage in other forms of protest) are the most disaffected with and disconnected from politics, and participants in legal demonstrations are the least so. Disinterest, however, is most common among those that do not engage in any form of protest whatsoever. The argument that people are disengaging with electoral politics but are instead taking up alternative forms of political participation does not garner much support: proportionally fewer protesters (aggregated) than non-protesters have failed to vote in the general election. Thus, the worrisome trends of disengagement identified in the opening paragraphs of this article cannot be said to be easily assailed by the re-birth of democratic phoenix. 
The ESS regression analysis predicting participation in street demonstrations supports the idea that stepping away from the ballot box is not always a step towards engagement in alternative forms of politics. Although more participants in legal demonstrations did vote compared to non-participants, participants in legal demonstrations are neither no more nor less likely to vote in a general election than those who have not engaged in a legal demonstration. Thus, the small minority of individuals who participate in legal demonstrations appear to be a sub-group of those that queue at the polls. If this is true, they do little to increase, in aggregate, the percentage of people engaged in political action. Although protesters (aggregated) are statistically significantly more likely to not to vote than non-protesters, there remains a significant proportion of the electorate who fail to participate in any form of politics measured by standard survey items.
Those who participate in legal demonstrations are also a subgroup of those who participate in protest more broadly defined, yet there are interesting differences in the extent to which the smaller group and the broader group are represented among those who are most disaffected and disconnected from politics. To recap: proportionally twice as many legal demonstration participants have no trust in parliament and political parties than protesters more generally, and far fewer aggregated protesters than street demonstrators have failed to contact a politician in the past 12 months. Having said this, the only statistically significant predictor to differ in the regression models predicting engagement in protest (aggregated) compared to participation in legal demonstrations is failure to vote in elections. Whilst there are no significant differences between those who do and do not participate in street demonstrations, those who protest (aggregated) are more likely to have not voted in the general election compared to those who have not protested at all. Although I find only one significant difference in the models using these two different dependent variables, this suggests that it would be a worthwhile exercise to extend this line of analytical enquiry by comparing how the predictors of protest (aggregated) compare to predictors of each of boycotts, pin/badge wearing, petition-signing and (should the data allow it) occupations.
Given the findings from the ESS analysis, we might assume that individuals who engage in legal protest (measured discretely) with a greater degree of intensity and frequency are going to be yet more politically interested, and be even more connected with formal political institutions. At least, that would be the story to be told if the variables in the ESS analysis work as a matter of degree. However, I find that only three variables – political interest, contacting a politician and closeness to a political party – increase in line with the extent of participation. Stalwarts are more politically interested and distrustful of the legal system than repeaters, repeaters are more so than returners, and returners more so than novices. Only stalwarts appear – when all other variables analysed are controlled for – distrusting of parliament and the political system. Yet even they are not distrustful of political parties. This may be because of their closer affiliation with minor / protest parties, for which they have a much higher proclivity to vote. Furthermore, all four groups of street protesters have taken efforts to contact politicians, and stalwarts – who we might have expected to feel disaffected from formal politics so much that they use regular protest as an alternative rather than extension to it – have the greatest proclivity to have contacted a politician in the past 12 months.
There is also an interesting relationship between whether individuals voted in the last general election and differential participation in street demonstrations. Stalwarts are the least likely to have voted in a general election.  Although generally speaking, withdrawal from the ballot box seems to go hand-in-hand with keeping off the streets for protest, it is also associated with frequent and intense participation in street demonstrations. Although stalwarts might compensate for withdrawal from the ballot box by frequent and intense participation in street demonstrations, this group is only a small minority of the sub-group that participates in legal demonstrations. Thus, the overall evidence seems to suggest that the outlook for political participation is bleaker than has been previously suggested by promises of a ‘democratic phoenix’.
That there are significant differences across the four types of street protesters in terms of their disaffection and disconnection from formal political institutions suggests that there is value in taking a more nuanced approach to understanding the drivers for participation in street protests, and that this is an approach that might be used to distinguish between those who participate in other political acts to differential degrees. But there are other considerations that need to be made here. The protest survey contextualises political participation, bringing the ‘political’ to the fore, and is likely, therefore, to illicit different answer responses than from a decontextualized survey. The challenge we face here is in singling out which differences between the protest survey sample and ESS sample are due to this contextualising, and which are due to the way in which the samples are constructed. In the main body of this article, for example, I pointed to the bias in measures of political interest to explain why so few of the protest survey population express no interest at all in politics: we know that the politically interested are over-represented. However, the stark difference in the numbers of politically interested in the protest survey compared to the ESS survey could also be due to contextualisation. Given that street demonstrators were surveyed whilst engaging in a political act, their interest in politics at that particular time is likely to be higher than at another point in time. Individual respondents are also more likely to read their participation in demonstrations as political acts if they are answering a survey in that context. This points to the potential utility of surveying individuals as they engage in other political acts to compare findings from these to those derived from the decontextualized survey method. Whilst contextualised surveys might be said to over-estimate political interest, not least because of response-rate bias, it is equally likely that decontextualized ones, as Dryzek (2000) has argued, will under-estimate it. 
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Table 2. Political disaffection by type and intensity of protest
	% not at all …
	Interested in politics	Trusting in parliament	Trusting in the legal system	Trusting in political parties
ESS data protest aggregated						
Yes	11.520.0	4.215.6	12.53.0	6.917.6
No				
ESS data legal demonstrations only						
Yes	11.019.9	9.47.2	8.35.0	14.811.3
No				









Table 3. Political disaffection by type and intensity of protest
	% 
	Not at all close to political party	Not voting in last general election	Not contacting a politician in past 12 months	Voting for a minor party
ESS data protest aggregated						
Yes	1.61.3	25.629.2	23.376.7	23.912.9
No				
ESS data legal demonstrations only						
Yes	0.81.3	21.129.3	67.476.7	20.812.9
No				



















































Close to political party	0.282	0.109	0.010**	1.326	0.124	0.058	0.033*	1.132
Voting (reference = voted for major party)			









Table 5. Multinomial regression for protest survey data: predicting differential participation in street demonstrations

 	B	S.E.	Sig.	Odds	B	S.E.	Sig.	Odds

























Close to political party	0.141	0.069	.042*	1.151	0.259	0.068	0.000***	1.295
Voting (reference = voted for major party)		 				 
































Close to political party	0.698	0.091	0.000*	2.009				
Voting (reference = voted for major party)		 				













^1	  This paper draws on data from the widely available European Social Survey and also on data from the European Science Foundation-funded Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation project (Klandermans et al 2009). The data from this project will be available for future analysis through the Belgian social science data archive within approximately 12 months. The UK part of the project was administered by the Economic and Social Research Council, grant reference: RES-062-23-1565.
^2	  Note that the work of Barnes, Kaase et al (1979) has received much criticism for focusing on protest potential rather than self-reported protest. See Rootes (1981) for a trenchant critique. 
^3	  See, for example, the classic work by Marsh (1977), Barnes, Kaase et al (1979) and Dekker et al (1997).
^4	  Unfortunately, the ESS dataset does not include the variable ‘occupying buildings’, a variable that is commonly aggregated into general measures of protest.
^5	  See http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/weighting.pdf for more information about the ESS design weightings.
^6	  In addition, multi-level models were run in MLwiN, testing for country effects on the distribution of the two separate dependent variables (whether or not the individual had participated in a legal demonstration in the past 12 months for the ESS data, and the category of protester for the protest survey data based on individuals’ intensity and frequency of protest). Between country variance for the ESS data predicting participation in street demonstrations was barely significant 0.004 (SE 0.002). When additional explanatory variables were added to the modelling of the ESS data, the country effects became insignificant as shown by the following: equation:Please see the supplementary material for a key to the variable names. For the protest survey data, between country variance was insignificant in a null model without explanatory variables added: 0.068 (SE 0.043).
^7	  We also surveyed protests in Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, Denmark and Mexico City. I excluded certain countries because of the availability of ESS data, or because only a few demonstrations were surveyed in these countries. Sweden was excluded because the education variable was coded differently for that case.
^8	  The span of 1-5 unfortunately means that those who had previously attended only one demonstration are in the same category as those who had previously attended 4, but this is an artifact of the questionnaire design. 
^9	  Note that the operationalization has been modified from Saunders et al (2012) in order to reduce the number of missing cases in the data.
^10	  Note that social class and/or employment status are frequently deployed in models seeking to predict political participation. However, due to the lack of comparable variables across the two data-sets for the present study, the best proxy available is whether the respondent was in paid employment (whether full- or part-time) or not. 
